Russian efforts to influence the 2016 US presidential election represent the most recent expression
of Moscow’s longstanding desire to undermine the US-led liberal democratic order, but these
activities demonstrated a significant escalation in directness, level of activity, and scope of effort
compared to previous operations.

We assess Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the US
presidential election. Russia’s goals were to undermine public faith in the US democratic process,
denigrate Secretary Clinton, and harm her electability and potential presidency. We further assess
Putin and the Russian Government developed a clear preference for President-elect Trump. We
have high confidence in these judgments.

 We also assess Putin and the Russian Government aspired to help President-elect Trump’s
election chances when possible by discrediting Secretary Clinton and publicly contrasting her
unfavorably to him. All three agencies agree with this judgment. CIA and FBI have high confidence
in this judgment; NSA has moderate confidence.

 Moscow’s approach evolved over the course of the campaign based on Russia’s understanding of the
electoral prospects of the two main candidates. When it appeared to Moscow that Secretary Clinton
was likely to win the election, the Russian influence campaign began to focus more on undermining
her future presidency.

 Further information has come to light since Election Day that, when combined with Russian behavior
since early November 2016, increases our confidence in our assessments of Russian motivations and
goals.

Moscow’s influence campaign followed a Russian messaging strategy that blends covert
intelligence operations—such as cyber activity—with overt efforts by Russian Government
agencies, state-funded media, third-party intermediaries, and paid social media users or “trolls.”
Russia, like its Soviet predecessor, has a history of conducting covert influence campaigns focused on US
presidential elections that have used intelligence officers and agents and press placements to disparage
candidates perceived as hostile to the Kremlin.

 Russia’s intelligence services conducted cyber operations against targets associated with the 2016 US
presidential election, including targets associated with both major US political parties.

 We assess with high confidence that Russian military intelligence (General Staff Main Intelligence
Directorate or GRU) used the Guccifer 2.0 persona and DCLeaks.com to release US victim data
obtained in cyber operations publicly and in exclusives to media outlets and relayed material to
WikiLeaks.

 Russian intelligence obtained and maintained access to elements of multiple US state or local
electoral boards. DHS assesses that the types of systems Russian actors targeted or
compromised were not involved in vote tallying.

 Russia’s state-run propaganda machine contributed to the influence campaign by serving as a
platform for Kremlin messaging to Russian and international audiences.
We assess Moscow will apply lessons learned from its Putin-ordered campaign aimed at the US
presidential election to future influence efforts worldwide, including against US allies and their
election processes.