man of few opinions wrote:
the culture of "going for it" on 4th down earlier and earlier in the game in situations that don't require it is a head-scratching trend, especially now that FG's from inside 50 are becoming nearly automatic. Same with going for 2 early in the game when you don't need it. I can't even count the number of times I have seen coaches go for 2 in the first half of games, fail, and end up unnecessarily having to chase that extra point the rest of the game by going for it over and over to try to keep it a one-score game, then being praised by announcers for converting one later in the game even though they never would should have had to go for it late in the game in the first place. A lot of these new coaches think they are re-inventing the game of football, and Brian Daboll is one of the worst offenders.
Obviously coaches sometimes make the wrong decision in the heat of the moment (MLF loves to use his “gut” to explain failed decisions), but recency bias also makes it seem like the wrong choice to go for it because you remember the failures more than the successes. As an example, yesterday (coincidentally as I was reading your previous post) Detroit went for it on 4th down inside the ten when the game was still close and immediately scored a TD. A fg at that point would have been seen as a victory for the Vikings. Instead it changed the trajectory of the game.
This article is now 2 years old but explains how the data breaks down the statistically optimal choice in given situations. As noted, there are still variables to factor in beyond hard stats in borderline decisions (such as the strength of your O vs the D), but the basic premise remains the same.
https://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/33059528/nfl-game-management-cheat-sheet-punt-go-kick-field-goal-fourth-downs-plus-2-point-conversion-recommendations